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One of the main disadvantages of currency boards is the rule-based character of this system and the 
resulting inflexibility in case of shocks, a frequently recurring event in transition countries. 
Accordingly, central banks under currency board arrangements (CBA) are unable to respond to 
short-term liquidity changes in the money market. To cushion negative effects of economic shocks 
on interest rates and on the volatility of banks’ liquidity the Estonian and Lithuanian central banks 
have to a limited extent used various monetary policy tools which, however, have neither 
undermined credibility of the central banks nor the ultimate goal of price stability. The most 
important instrument has been reserve requirements. Changes of the reserve requirement base, the 
reserve requirement ratio and several other rules to hold reserve requirements have affected the 
liquidity of the banking systems in both countries. The significance of reserve requirements 
becomes clear when reserve requirements are set in relation to the monetary base. Between 1998 
and 2000 in Estonia this ratio even ranged between 40 and 50 percent and Lithuania this ratio 
amounted to about 20 percent during this period. Other instruments than reserve requirements 
played a minor role because the volume was small. 
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I.  Scope for monetary policy under the Estonian and Lithuanian currency boards 
A.  The rule-based character of currency boards 
One of the main arguments against currency boards focuses on the rule-based character 
of this system and the resulting inflexibility in case of shocks, a frequently recurring event 
in transition countries. Accordingly, central banks under currency board arrangements 
(CBA) are unable to respond to short-term liquidity changes in the money market. 
Nevertheless, the Estonian and Lithuanian central banks have to a limited extent used 
various monetary policy tools which, however, have neither undermined credibility of the 
central banks nor the ultimate goal of price stability. Inflation in both countries declined 
substantially after the introduction of currency boards and remained below 6 percent since 
1999 in both countries. (EBRD 2003) 
Transition countries are characterized by a high degree of an overall economic 
instability. At the macroeconomic level, in particular at the initial stage of the transition 
process, macroeconomic instability is commonly a prevalent phenomenon. 
Macroeconomic shocks – such as high losses in real GDP, volatile capital flows or interest 
rates – are events that frequently recur. At the microeconomic level, the aim is to develop 
institutions as well as the enterprise and financial sector for a market system. Transition 
economies are often hit, for example, by banking crises which negatively affect the real 
economy. An appropriate monetary and exchange rate system for transition countries 
should therefore not only guarantee macroeconomic stability and a restructuring of the 
enterprise and financial sector but also be flexible enough to cope with economic shocks. 
However, under a currency board it is difficult to react to shocks, since such boards are 
rule-based monetary systems. The three main features of a currency board – a fixed 
exchange rate, full convertibility and coverage of the monetary base with gold and foreign 
assets to at least 100 percent – have various implications for central bank balance sheets 
and thus also for the process of money supply. Liabilities are identical to those of a full-
fledged central bank; they include currency in circulation and the total deposits of banks 
with the central bank. However, assets differ from those of a full-fledged central bank in 
that they consist only of net foreign assets and gold. Items such as credits to financial 
institutions or the government are not included. (Hanke et al. 1993) The Estonian and 
Lithuanian central bank balance sheets indicate that such balance sheets deviate only 
slightly from those presented under pure currency boards, as can be seen from Figure A1 
and Figure A2 in the appendix. 
In general, the asset side indicates how the monetary base is created and thus shows 
how the central bank can influence the monetary base. Consequently, under a currency 
board system the central bank is unable to directly control its own assets, and therefore the 
monetary base is beyond its control as well. What we have here is a rule-based monetary 
policy in which changes in the monetary base are induced by movements in balances of 
payments. The core of this policy is the rule that no credits will be granted to commercial 
banks or the government. The reason why market forces play an important role here is that 
changes in balances of payments are generated by the transactions of economic agents. 
B.  Flexibilities under currency board systems 
 
Even though this system must be seen as a very rigid one, it does contain certain 
flexibilities which can cushion economic shocks. First, it provides for balance-of-payments 
adjustment processes which absorb economic shocks. In the short-term the adjustment    2
mechanism operates through the uncovered interest rate, and in the medium-term this may 
also involve adjustment mechanisms similar to those under the gold standard, since the two 
systems are very similar in nature.  
Second, under currency boards central banks can influence the money supply process, at 
least to a limited extent, by making use of monetary policy instruments. There is one direct 
possibility to use monetary instruments. The central bank is able to cover the monetary 
base with foreign currency reserves amounting to more than 100 percent. In this case the 
central bank can use its reserves in excess of 100 percent for an independent monetary 
policy. In addition, the central bank can use monetary tools which do not require the 
creation of high-powered money, above all the reserve requirements. (Berensmann 2002) 
The present paper deals with monetary policy instruments used by the Estonian and 
Lithuanian central banks. Although both systems deviate from a pure currency board 
system with these monetary policies, the use of such monetary tools have not jeopardized 
the stability of the monetary and exchange rate systems. On the contrary, this limited use 
of monetary policy instruments has mitigated the effects on interest rates of the volatility of 
bank liquidity. 
1. Estonia 
Although the Bank of Estonia has used several monetary policy instruments, it has 
neither pursued an active interest-rate policy nor influenced the liquidity of the banking 
system to the extent that conventional central banks have. From the technical point of 
view, the currency board system constantly and strongly influences the liquidity of the 
banking system through the forex window, but this is of course not the outcome of an 
active central bank monetary policy. The main aim has been to conduct a monetary policy 
which is based on stability and a fixed exchange rate. 
“Due to the currency board arrangement and certain self-regulation of the system the 
monetary policy of Eesti Pank is directed not towards active interest rate policy and 
regular liquidity management but, first and foremost, towards a framework enhancing 
the smooth performance and stability of the fixed exchange rate based monetary 
system.” (Bank of Estonia 2000a, p. 39) 
In Estonia, the central bank has at its disposal a range of instruments which can be 
financed by excess central bank reserves. According to Article 14 of the Law of the Bank 
of Estonia, the Estonian central bank can use monetary instruments and establish various 
regulations. 
“The Bank of Estonia has the right to use the following measures to regulate the 
currency circulation: issuing, buying and selling of securities; establishing the reserve 
requirement and other regulations to apply to all credit institutions operating in 
Estonia; granting loans to credit institutions; establishing credit limitations for credit 
institutions.“ (Bank of Estonia 1994b, p. 5) 
However, only a limited number of monetary tools have been used since the 
introduction of the currency board. These instruments include the following: changes in 
reserve requirements, selling or buying of certificates of deposit, the standing deposit 
facility, and emergency credits aimed at providing liquidity to some banks during the 
banking crisis.    3
The Estonian central bank is able to use monetary policy instruments as long as its 
foreign reserves exceed the minimum amount required under the Estonian currency board 
system. The Bank of Estonia refers to this minimum amount as the foreign reserves net: 
“The central bank can interfere to the extent by which the external reserves at its’ 
disposal exceed the minimum determined by the currency board. Naturally, the use of 
such a buffer for regulating liquidity has to be clearly defined and rests on definite 
rules in order not to harm the general credibility of the currency board framework. On 
the other hand, the commercial banks’ own liquidity buffers in the central bank 
(reserve requirement, for example) have been strengthened or the possibilities of the 
banks to exchange their liquidity reserves kept in foreign currency into the national 
currency at the central bank (swaps, etc.) have been improved.” (Bank of Estonia 
1997a, pp. 55-56) 
One of the most important indicators for the use of monetary policy instruments is the 
central bank balance sheet. In Estonia loans to financial institutions have been very small 
in relation to foreign assets because credits to financial institutions have amounted at most 
to 4 percent of foreign assets, with the percentage declining considerably between 1994 
and 2002 (Figure  1). The volume of certificates of deposit, which can be found on the 
liability side of the central bank balance sheet, were low: they varied between 0 and 60 
million EEK during 1992 and 2000. The most important monetary policy instrument has 
been reserve requirements, which amounted to 15 percent of the monetary base in 1996 
and rose to about 50 percent in the first half of 1999. 
 
Figure  1: Loans of the Estonian central bank to financial institutions 
(In millions of EEK) 
Source: Bank of Estonia, 2003b, central bank balance sheet  
In view of this limited scope, the Estonian central bank is unable to control interest 
rates. However, if the aim is to express the system in terms of the conventional framework, 
the indirect ceiling for money market interest rates must be seen as the penalty rate. The 
indirect floor is the remuneration rate for required reserves, because reserve requirements 
are the most important instrument of domestic liquidity management. (Bank of Estonia 
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“If in these circumstances the lowest possible interest rate is the so-called standing 
deposit facility rate, then the highest rate on the interbank market is theoretically 
shaped by the penalty interest rate applied by Eesti Pank to punish credit institutions 
for non-compliance with the reserve requirement.” (Bank of Estonia 1998a, p. 56) 
2. Lithuania 
Similarly, the Bank of Lithuania has used monetary policy instruments since the 
introduction of the currency board in 1994. From 1997 to 1999 the Lithuanian central bank 
established the Lithuanian Monetary Policy Program, in the course of which the currency 
board was to have been replaced by a full-fledged central bank. (Bank of Lithuania 1997a) 
However, in 1999 the Bank of Lithuania set out its Guidelines for the Application of the 
Bank of Lithuania Monetary Policy Instruments. (Bank of Lithuania 2000b) Under these 
guidelines, the three main characteristics of currency boards were not to be abandoned, 
although a wider range of monetary tools had been established since mid-1997. The central 
bank balance sheet indicates, however, that the volume of credits granted to banks was 
small between 1994 and 2002 as can be seen from Figure  2. 
 
Figure  2: Bank of Lithuania’s claims vis-à-vis commercial banks 
(In millions of litas) 
Source: Bank of Lithuania, 2003 
Monetary policy instruments prior to the Monetary Policy Program (1994-1997) 
Under the Law of the Bank of Lithuania, the use of monetary instruments was restricted 
by the “Law on the Credibility of the litas”; the following monetary or other instruments 
were available between 1994 and 1997: Rediscount operations (Article 26), credit 
operations (Article 27), reserve requirements (Article 2), purchase and sale of debt 
instruments (securities) issued by the Republic of Lithuania (Article 26). In the latter case, 
since the Bank of Lithuania acted only as a fiscal agent, these instruments could not be 
seen as a monetary tool of the central bank. 
The Monetary Policy Program 
In January 1997 the Bank of Lithuania established the Monetary Policy Programme for 
1997-1999 in order to provide a three-stage exit strategy for the currency board system 
(Box 1). The main aim of the Monetary Policy Program was to intensify economic 
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of three stages, the Bank of Lithuania failed to implement the second and third stages. 
(Bank of Lithuania 1997a; Berensmann 2002, IMF, 1999b) 
 
Box 1: Monetary Policy Programme (1997-1999) 
The first stage 
In the first stage the Bank of Lithuania introduced several monetary instruments such as repo 
transactions for government securities between the central bank and banks; these were interest-rate 
auctions. Lombard loans were provided for but not used. Reserve requirements were maintained. 
The Bank of Lithuania could have issued rediscount bills of exchange and reverse repos, though it 
chose not to do so. 
The second stage 
  At this stage the currency board was to have been replaced by a full-fledged central bank 
which would have been able to conduct monetary policy. At the same time, the indicators and 
limitations were to have been shifted from net foreign reserves to net domestic assets, defined as 
reserve money  minus net foreign reserves. The net foreign reserve requirements of the Bank of 
Lithuania established in Article 1 in the Law on the Credibility of the litas would thus have been 
abolished. However, net foreign reserve requirements would not have been abrogated fully because 
Article 1 would have included the following provision: “the litas put into circulation by the Bank of 
Lithuania must be covered by gold reserves and convertible foreign currency reserves of the Bank 
of Lithuania to the extent necessary to ensure uninterrupted external payments and stability of the 
above amendments.” (Bank of Lithuania 1997a, pp. 13) 
  Formally, the Bank of Lithuania would have advised the government to amend the Law on the 
Credibility of the Litas. One amendment would have referred to the assets of the Bank of Lithuania, 
which would have been allowed to provide credits to domestic credit institutions. However, the 
Bank of Lithuania would not have been allowed to provide credits to the government. The second 
feature of the currency board (established in Article 3), the fixed exchange rate, would have 
changed in the following way: the anchor currency would have been a currency basket of euros and 
US-$. The exchange rate and the composition of the basket would have been established by the 
Bank of Lithuania in coordination with the Government of the Republic of Lithuania.  
  In the case of crisis, a 20 percent decrease of the foreign currency reserves of the Bank of 
Lithuania and/or if the crisis continued for more than three months, the Bank of Lithuania would 
have established the following provisions: 1.) the required reserves against foreign currency 
liabilities could have been converted into litas; 2.) commercial banks would be able to include cash 
balances to meet their reserve requirements; 3.) government securities denominated in litas would 
be accepted as part of the required minimum reserves; 4.) the central bank would be able to require 
different rates for reserve requirements on different kinds of deposits; 5.) the Bank of Lithuania 
would be able to extend repo transactions of government securities in the primary and secondary 
markets; 6.) the Bank would be allowed to provide more liquidity loans to commercial banks with 
the aim of bolstering public credibility; and 7.) the Law on the Insurance of Deposits of Individual 
would be open to extension. 
The third stage  
  This stage would not have begun before 1999, i.e. before the introduction of the euro. At the 
beginning of this stage, the litas would have been pegged to a single currency or to a currency 
basket. However, this pegging of the litas to the euro and US-$ basket would have ended after two 
years because Lithuanian monetary and financial policy must comply with the EU membership 
requirements by the end of 2000. The peg to the euro -US-$ currency basket would not have been 
implemented if external payments (structure of public debts and deposits at banks) had increased in 
EU currencies. Initially, the exchange rate would have been fixed in absolute terms. However, an 
exchange rate band could have been introduced, at the end of 1999 at the earliest. 
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Guidelines for Monetary Policy 
In contrast to the Monetary Policy Program, the Guidelines for Monetary Policy, which 
were established on 1 July 1999, abide by the main features of the currency board. 
“I. General Provisions 
1. The Guidelines for the Application of the Bank of Lithuania Monetary Policy 
Instruments have been prepared in accordance with the Monetary Policy Programme 
of the Bank of Lithuania for 1997-1999. 
2. The purpose of this document is to specify the guidelines for the application of the 
monetary policy instruments of the Bank of Lithuania under the conditions of the 
fixed exchange rate regime of the Litas by defining the goals, conditions and limits 
thereof, and to provide for the improvement of monetary policy instruments having 
regard to the changes in the economic environment and Lithuania’s intention to 
become a member of the European Union and, at a later stage, to satisfy requirements 
set for the participation in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
3. The guidelines for the application of the monetary policy instruments of the Bank of 
Lithuania shall depend upon: 
3.1 fixed exchange rate regime of the Litas and unrestricted exchange of the Litas into 
the anchor currency (currencies) and the anchor currency (currencies) into the Litas, 
performed by the Bank of Lithuania; and 
3.2 the principle of full backing of the Litas-denominated liabilities of the Bank of 
Lithuania by gold and convertible foreign currency reserves held by the Bank of 
Lithuania.” (Bank of Lithuania 2000b, Resolution of the Board of the Bank of 
Lithuania, On the Guidelines for the Application of the Bank of Lithuania Monetary 
Policy Instruments) 
“The Bank of Lithuania is committed to stabilisation of the external value of the 
currency. The use of monetary policy instruments shall be based on the principle of the 
full backing of the litas denominated liabilities of the Bank of Lithuania by gold and 
convertible foreign currency reserves held by the Bank of Lithuania.” (Abazorius 2000, 
p. 3) 
Since 1997 the Bank of Lithuania has been allowed to pursue monetary policy on the 
basis of monetary tools which grant commercial banks access to new credit lines. These 
monetary instruments include: overnight lombard facilities, liquidity loans (lender of last 
resort loans), repurchase transactions, reserve requirements and time deposit auctions. 
(Bank of Lithuania 1997a) Reserve requirements were not abolished and are still in use, as 










Table 1:  Monetary policy instruments in Estonia and Lithuania 
  Estonia Lithuania 
RR
a     The most important instrument  The most important instrument 
Standing deposit facility  a) Remuneration of the whole RR 
since 7/00 at the ECB deposit rate 
b) Remuneration of the RR above the 
monthly minimum rate  
•  7/96-10/97: interest set by 
the BoE 
•  since 11/97: Bundesbank 
discount rate 
•  since 1/99: ECB deposit rate
 
Emergency credits  Few emergency credits  Few emergency credits 
Standing facility  Forex market 
•  6/92 – 6/96 exchange rate 
spread of DM/EEK 
purchases and sales:     
0.002 EEK 
•  since 7/96 no spread 
Forex market 
Since 4/94 exchange rate spread of 
US-$/LTL (Euro/LTL) purchases 
and sales:  
•  0.1 % of amount for 2-day 
transactions  
•  0.15 % of amount for 1-
day transactions 
•  0.25 % of amount for 
same-day transactions 
Overnight loan    Has rarely been used until 6/2003 
Liquidity loans    •  Interest rate:  
  Until 11/1999: 13%;  
  since 11/1999: VILIBOR+4%
•  Maturity 1-3 month 
•  Irregular 
Open market operations: 
repurchase agreements 
Short-term certificates of deposit 
3/93 – 5/00 
28-days discountable CDs with a 
limited issue up to 30 mill. EEK 
transactions on the secondary market 
a) Repurchase agreements 
4/97-10/98 
•  Repurchase transactions 
for government securities 
•  1 month 
•  interest rate auctions 
b) Time deposit auctions 
8/97-2/00 
•  Lower limit of interest 
rates 
•  Irregular 
•  Maturity: 6-14 days 
Facility to sell foreign 
securities  
Since 1/2001 the BoE can buy 
securities from banks, which fulfill 
the quality requirements established 
to meet RR 
 
a For a detailed description of RR see Table 2 and Table 3. 
Source:  Bank of Estonia (1997a), (2000), (2001) and (2003a); Bank of Lithuania (1997a),  
(1998a), (1999a), (2000a), (2001), (2002)    8
II.  Monetary policy instruments under the Estonian and Lithuanian currency board 
A. Reserve  requirements 
Since the introduction of the currency boards in Estonia and Lithuania, reserve 
requirements have been used actively as a monetary instrument and have been the most 
important monetary tool in use. The significance of reserve requirements becomes clear 
when the Estonian reserve requirements are set in relation to the monetary base (Figure  3). 
At the beginning of 1996
1 monthly minimum requirements amounted to roughly 15 percent 
of the monetary base, but this ratio increased substantially to 22 percent in July 1997, 
rising to 32 percent in November 1997. The latter upsurge reflected the introduction of 
additional liquidity requirements in the same month; these are added to the minimum 
monthly reserve requirements in Estonia. Additional liquidity requirements have nearly the 
same effect as an increase in the reserve ratio. The rises in May 1998 and also in 
September and December 1998 were due primarily to substantial declines in the monetary 
base
2 and a broadening of the base of calculation. The decline in this ratio in April 1999 
was mainly generated by a substantial increase of the monetary base. 
 
Figure  3: Ratio of reserve requirements to the monetary base in Estonia 
(In per cent) 
Source: data provided by the Bank of Estonia and IMF, 2001, own calculation 
Reserve requirements in Lithuania have been less important compared to Estonia. 
Before the banking crisis of May 1994 to November 1995, reserve requirements in national 
and foreign currencies were between 17 and 23 percent of the monetary base (Figure  4). 
Subsequently, the Bank of Lithuania decreased reserve requirements substantially to 0.2 
percent of the monetary base in order to ease a liquidity crisis of the banking system which 
occurred between November 1995 and April 1996. However, during 1997, reserve 
requirements as a percent of the monetary base went up again. (Berensmann 2002) 
                                                           
1  Earlier data were not available. 
2  These low levels of the monetary base mainly resulted from the Russian crisis and the subsequent 
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Figure  4: Ratio of reserve requirements to the monetary base in Lithuania 
(In per cent) 
Between May and November 1997 data for reserve requirements were not available. 
Source: data provided by the Bank of Lithuania and IMF, 2001, own calculation 
1.  Functions of reserve requirements 
Five main functions of reserve requirements are relevant for the transition process: they 
provide a monetary tool for which the central bank does not need to create central bank 
money; they limit the expansionary effects of capital inflows on domestic credit; they 
assume the role of a buffer and stabilizer of money market interest rates; they serve to 
control the liquidity of commercial banks; and they serve to avoid crises of confidence. 
Both central banks have sought to limit capital inflows by extending the reserve 
requirement base. The central banks have sterilized capital inflows, which have had an 
expansionary effect on the monetary base and thus on monetary aggregates, by extending 
the reserve requirement base to include net liabilities of banks vis-à-vis foreign banks. 
(Bank of Estonia 1999b and Bank of Lithuania 1999a and 2000a) 
“Whereas the restrictive and liquidity functions of the minimum reserve system have 
been the matter of reserve requirement level, the capital inflow sterilisation issues 
have been first and foremost related to the composition of the reserve base. For 
example the introduction of financial guarantees and net credit position of the resident 
banking sector vis-à-vis the foreign banks in the reserve base have served the aim of 
dampening excessive capital inflows inflating the macroeconomic environment. Thus 
the sterilisation issue has to be analysed also through reserve requirement base.” 
(Bank of Estonia 2000c, p. 10) 
According to resolution No. 52 II 1. of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, reserve 
requirements are to be used as a monetary policy instrument aimed at influencing the 
liquidity of the Lithuanian banking system. (Bank of Lithuania 1995 and 2000a, p. 42) 
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important factor in transition countries, where banking supervision is difficult. (Abazorius 
1996)
3 
“Required reserves shall be an instrument of the monetary policy of the Bank of 
Lithuania, which aids in the regulation of money supply and liquidity of the banking 
system.” (Bank of Lithuania 1995, p. 63) 
The stabilizer or buffer function is important in currency board regimes because the 
institutional setting of currency boards lacks a lender of last resort. Other than monthly 
averaging, under currency boards central banks lack built-in stabilizers such as the 
monetary policy tools used. In addition, the stabilizer or buffer function is crucial in 
transition countries because the risk of monetary shocks is more severe in the environment 
of transition countries than in advanced industrialized countries. 
“Within Estonia’s monetary policy set-up the main objectives of the reserve 
requirements has been to act as a liquidity buffer in the monetary system and in certain 
cases also to curb excessive economic activity. At the same time has prevailed the 
liquidity guarantee function, which lies in creating sufficient buffers against short-
term volatility. As the currency board arrangement limits the ability of the central 
bank to manage the liquidity in the monetary system as well as to provide liquidity 
support, the reserve requirement has a significant role in securing the stability of the 
Estonian kroon.” (Bank of Estonia 1999b, p. 40) 
In both countries reserve requirements can to some extent serve to cushion interest rate 
movements. In Estonia, for example, reserve requirements as a percentage of the monetary 
base have ranged between 15 and 50 percent. Moreover, the fact that banks are allowed to 
hold their reserves on a monthly-average basis contributes to cushioning interest rates. The 
influence of these monetary tools on the monetary base has been substantial by currency 
board standards. However, their influence is quite small compared to the discretionary 
powers of central banks in industrialized countries, where the central bank has a greater 
influence on the monetary base. 
“Its main function is to provide buffer reserves for the settlement system in order to 
guarantee the regular daily payments.” (Ross, T. and M., 1995, p. 14) 
Under currency board regimes, reserve requirements can be a very important instrument 
for releasing or absorbing at least some of the system’s liquidity because central banks 
under currency boards have access to other instruments only to a limited extent. For 
reserve requirements, however, central banks do not need high-powered money to use this 
instrument. Both central banks affected the liquidity of the banking systems by changing 
reserve requirement bases, by varying the amount of cash holdings, which banks are 
permitted to deduct from their required reserve holdings. In Estonia, additional liquidity 
requirements served to absorb liquidity. In Lithuania, reserve requirement ratios were 
changed several times since the introduction of the currency board arrangement. 
In view of the level of confidence in the banking system, already low as a result of its 
underdevelopment, the risk of crises of confidence is a good reason to introduce reserve 
                                                           
3  “On the other hand, primitive as it may seem, reserve requirements is the indicator of liquidity and solvency. 
The failure of the bank to implement reserve requirements is the primary sign of a liquidity crisis.“ 
(Abazorius 1996, p. 10)    11
requirements in transition economies . In fact, all of the Baltic states experienced deep 
banking crises between 1992 and 1996, some of which resulted in bank runs. (Berensmann 
2002) 
“To increase the liquidity of the financial system and to reduce its vulnerability to runs 
of deposits, banks may be subject to reserve requirements in excess of amounts strictly 
needed by banks as settlement balances, as in Estonia and Lithuania and, until recently 
in Argentina.” (Balino et al. 1997, pp. 21-22) 
2.  Rules for the calculation of reserve requirements 
Reserve requirement base 
In Estonia credit institutions are required to pay reserve requirements for demand, 
savings and time deposits in domestic and foreign currency which are owned by central 
and local governments, non-financial public enterprises, private enterprises, non-bank 
financial institutions and individuals. (Bank of Estonia 1992; Decision No. 1 of 17 June 
1992; BIS, 1995 and 1998) The following items were excluded from the base used to 
calculate reserve requirements until 1996: commercial bank debts to the central bank, 
lending and foreign grants (= technical assistance funds) to the government, deposits from 
other commercial banks and net liabilities vis-à-vis foreign banks. 
In July 1996 the calculation base was extended to include other securities or other bank 
debts of the same nature
4. It also became necessary to cover certain types of securities 
because commercial banks were seeking to minimize their reserve requirement levels. 
(Bank of Estonia 1996, President’s decree No. 16) Since banks did not have to pay in 
reserve requirements for credits with foreign banks, reserve requirements had negative 
allocation effects. As a consequence, banks sought to circumvent them. For these reasons – 
i.e. to achieve an equal treatment of foreign and domestic credits, to limit credit expansion 
and to enhance liquidity buffers – net liabilities of banks vis-à-vis foreign banks have been 
included in the reserve requirement base since July 1997. 
Furthermore, non-monetary financial institutes which offer close substitutes for the 
credits granted by commercial banks were not affected. Accordingly, commercial banks 
had a disadvantage compared to non-monetary financial institutes. Banks sought to 
circumvent reserve requirements by channeling capital inflows through non-bank financial 
institutions. Consequently, the basis was further extended: credits to other commercial 
banks and financial guarantees issued to financing institutions and non-resident credit 
institutions have also been subject to reserve requirements since August 1998.
5 This 
measure has not only limited the circumvention of reserve requirements but has also 
improved the monetary system’s liquidity buffers. The volume of required reserves has 
gone up and the volume of banks’ guarantees to foreign credit institutions and non-bank 
financial institutions has declined. (Bank of Estonia 1998b; 1998c; 1999a) 
The Bank of Estonia successfully used these extensions of the reserve requirement base 
to influence the liquidity of the banking system. Figure  5 shows that reserve requirements 
increased considerably in July 1997 as well as in August/September 1998. However, these 
extensions were necessary to ensure that all domestic and foreign financial institutions 
                                                           
4  No further information is available on maturities. 
5  In August 1998 only 50 per cent of the enlarged part of the reserve requirement base was subject to 
reserve requirements, and in September the figure was 100 per cent. The Bank of Estonia's intention 
was  to cushion the effect of the extended reserve requirement base. (Bank of Estonia 1999a)    12
were treated equally. In addition, they absorbed liquidity from the banking system in the 
face of substantial capital inflows. Moreover, these changes improved liquidity buffers. 
 
Figure  5: Reserve requirements in Estonia 
(In millions of EEK) 
Source: data provided by the Bank of Estonia 
In Lithuania, the reserve requirement base has been enlarged considerably since Aril 1994. 
Initially, reserve requirements were only demanded for liabilities to residents in domestic 
currency as well as in freely convertible currencies (time and demand deposits, including 
balances in customers’ clearing, current and other accounts). Since January 1997, commercial 
banks’ liabilities in foreign currency have also been subject to reserve requirements. In August 
1997 the reserve requirement base was enlarged to include commercial banks’ liabilities in 
non-convertible currencies. As a result of these expansions, and due to increasing deposits at 
banks, the calculation base went up considerably from January 13, 1997, to December 13, 
1997 (maintenance starting 13, December): in domestic currency the increase amounted to 
62.5 percent and for foreign currency the figure was 42.1 percent. (Bank of Lithuania 1998a) 
In January 1998
6 the calculation base was extended to non-residents holding both domestic 
and convertible currencies. The reasons for this were, first, that the Bank of Lithuania desired 
to treat all banks equally; and, second, the central bank aimed to guarantee bank liquidity. To 
avoid negative effects on the liquidity of banks, the Bank of Lithuania required only 5 percent 
for non-residents’ liabilities in mid-January 1998; this was increased by 1 percent every month 
until a figure of 10 percent was reached.
7  
In April 1998 the base was further enlarged to include commitments to foreign commercial 
banks. Like the Estonian central bank, the Lithuanian central bank set out to limit bank lending 
in foreign currencies and thereby to restrict capital inflows. Nevertheless, foreign liabilities of 
banks increased by nearly 50 percent from the end of 1997 to the end of 1998. Since April 
1998 commitments to other domestic financial institutions have also been included in the base 
used to calculate reserve requirements. These extensions of the calculation base increased 
reserve requirements, which is shown in Figure  6. Required reserves in domestic currency 
                                                           
6  The Bank of Lithuania had already decided about this extension in 1997, although it became effective 
only in January 1998. 
7  Reserve requirements imposed against convertible foreign currencies and paid either in US-$ or in 



























































requirement   13
went up by 19.3 million litas, the corresponding figure for foreign currencies being 180.3 
million litas. The calculation base increased 2.1-fold (1803.1 million litas). In April 1998 
reserve requirements in foreign currency increased by 52 million litas compared to March 
of the same year. (Bank of Lithuania 1999a, 1999b and 2000a) 
 
Figure  6: Reserve requirements in national and foreign currency in Lithuania 
(In millions of litas) 
Between May and November 1997 data for reserve requirements were not available. 
Source: Bank of Lithuania, 1999a, 2000a and data provided by the Bank of Lithuania 
Moreover, the Russian crisis also affected the development of reserve requirements. While 
reserve requirements increased steadily from May to October 1998, they declined con-
siderably in the fourth quarter of 1998. Reserve requirements in domestic currency 
declined by 4.8 percent between 13 October and 12 December because a substantial 
amount of litas was exchanged into foreign currency. Since the first stage of the restoration 
of savings began in November 1998, required reserves in domestic currency equaled those 
at the end of the third quarter. Similarly, required reserves in foreign currencies went up 
between April and September 1998, but remained at the same level in the fourth quarter of 
1998, despite exchange of domestic currency into foreign currency. Domestic and foreign 
investors began to exit the Lithuanian financial market. However, in December part of 
restored savings was also deposited in foreign currencies. (Bank of Lithuania 1999a) 
As deposits of the State Social Security Fund, state and local governments, and assets of 
private enterprises in transit accounts declined in 1999, required reserves in domestic 
currency fell by 3.2 million litas, despite savings restoration (1,260.46 million litas) in 
1999. The latter led to an increase of deposits in litas by 33.5 percent (483.1 million litas). 
However, a considerable share of these savings was held in foreign currency deposits. The 
calculation base for reserve requirements in foreign currencies went up by 27.6 percent 
(944.6 million litas). Consequently, required reserves grew by 94 million litas. (Bank of 
Lithuania 2000a) 
Deposits with maturities above one year denominated in both domestic and foreign 
currencies have not been subject to reserve requirements since October 1997. This policy 
aims at raising the incentive for commercial banks to attract long-term deposits, as these 
banks are able to offer better conditions for long-term credits. However, in view of the 
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influence on reserve requirements by the end of 1999. This measure took time to become 
effective. (Bank of Lithuania 1998a and 1998b, Rules for required reserves of commercial 
banks, Resolution 18 September 1997, No. 205 and June 26 1997 No. 141) 
Additional liquidity requirements 
Estonian commercial banks had to meet so-called additional liquidity
8 requirements 
between November 1, 1997, and June 30, 2000; these were introduced for the following 
reasons: to increase liquidity buffers, to contribute to a declining credits and to maintain 
financial stability in case of financial crisis. Consequently, deposits of banks with the Bank 
of Estonia increased substantially. In addition, the establishment of additional liquidity 
requirements provided a positive signal during the Asian crisis at the end of 1997. (Bank of 
Estonia 1998a and 1999a) 
The base used to calculate additional liquidity requirements is identical to the base used 
for reserve requirements. Banks can use their demand deposits only to meet additional 
liquidity requirements. As for reserve requirements, additional liquidity requirements only 
have to be met on a monthly-average basis, and they are calculated in the same way as 
reserve requirements. The maintenance period begins on the first banking day of the 
following month. Initially, the ratio amounted to 2 percent of the reserve requirement base, 
though this figure this was increased one month later to 3 percent. The penalty for failure 
to meet additional liquidity requirements was a rise in reserve requirements. (Bank of 
Estonia 1997c, President’s decree: on establishing additional liquidity requirements to 
credit institutions) 
Additional liquidity requirements have nearly the same effect as an increase of the 
reserve ratio. In contrast to the reserve requirements, additional liquidity requirements 
were remunerated at the Deutsche Bundesbank’s discount rate until December 1998, and 
since January 1999 they have been remunerated at the ECB deposit interest rate. Reserve 
requirements have only borne interest since July 1999. Figure  5 illustrates the impact of 
additional liquidity requirements on reserve requirements in November/December 1997. 
Calculation period 
To calculate the required reserve level, liabilities are usually multiplied by reserve 
ratios. In Estonia, the calculated reserve requirement level has been based on the average 
of the liabilities at the end of three ten-day periods (end of the month, following 10 days, 
following 20 days) since July 1996. In Lithuania, the required reserve level is calculated by 
multiplying liabilities by reserve ratios. In Lithuania calculation of reserve requirements is 
based on the average of four specific dates during a one-month period (7th, 15th, 23rd, and 
30th/31st). The exchange rates on these days are used as the base to calculate the reserve 
requirements in foreign liabilities.
9 
Reserve ratio 
In Estonia, the ratio was changed only in 1992 when it was reduced from 15 percent to 
10 percent. On the contrary in Lithuania, reserve ratios have been used actively as a 
monetary tool to provide liquidity to commercial banks.
10 In April 1995 the Bank of 
                                                           
8  One reason for introducing additional liquidity requirements and not increasing the reserve ratio was that 
the central bank was able to establish this measure without a legal act; i.e. it could be put into effect 
immediately. 
9  If these days are bank holidays, the exchange rates of the preceding business days are used instead. 
10  Apart from one exception, all Lithuanian commercial banks have been subject to reserve requirements. 
At the end of 1994, the State Agricultural Bank was exempted from reserve requirements because it    15
Lithuania lowered the reserve ratio from twelve to ten percent, a level at which they 
remained until February 1996. However, banks had been exempted from reserve 
requirements from February until May 1996 because they faced liquidity problems, partly 
due to the banking crises. In May 1996 the rates of required reserves were raised to five 
percent, in June they rose to six percent, and subsequently they were gradually extended by 
one percentage point in every three-month period, reaching a level of 10 percent in June 
1997. In 2001, reserve requirement ratio was lowered to 8 percent. (Bank of Lithuania 
1996 Resolution No. 122, 1998a and 2002) 
3.  Rules for calculating the actual level required 
The rule used to calculate the actual level required determines whether banks have to 
maintain actual reserve requirements on average over a month or on a daily basis. In 
Estonia, commercial banks had to hold reserve requirements on a daily basis until July 
1996. Since then, reserve requirements have only had to be met on a monthly-average 
basis. This new regulation is advantageous since it cushions fluctuations in liquidity needs 
during a reserve period without the intervention of the central bank. Banks are able to 
balance short-term deficits with surpluses over a month, which also supports the stability 
of interest rates in the money market. Reserve requirements are a kind of working balance. 
(Bank of Estonia 1997a) This buffer function decreases within the maintenance period 
because the number of days available to compensate for reserve deficiencies on previous 
days declines towards the end of the period. 
The calculated reserve requirement level has been based on the average of the ends of 
three ten-day periods (end of the month, following 10 days, following 20 days) since 
March 1993. The last calculation is done on the 20th, and it is valid for the following 
month. Reserve requirements for the next month begin on the first banking day of each 
month. (Bank of Estonia 1996, President’s decree No. 16) Hence, the calculation period 
goes ahead the maintenance period. This increases bank flexibility because banks are 
aware of the required reserve level before they have to meet the reserve requirements. 
In Lithuania, commercial banks have to meet their reserve requirements on average over 
a given month. The maintenance period starts on the 13th day of every month and ends on 
the 12th day of the following month. The calculation periods for actual and required 
reserves are therefore not identical: they are instead staggered, with the calculation period 
preceding the maintenance period. For example, if the calculation period is April, then the 
maintenance period begins on 13 May and ends on 12 June. The central bank is obliged to 
calculate required reserves by 10 May.
11 
Consideration of vault cash for meeting reserve requirements 
Since July 1994 banks have been allowed to include their EEK cash in their required 
reserves, though initially they were able to use up to 50 percent of total reserve 
requirements. This measure boosted the liquidity buffers of banks and reduced the level of 
reserves required to be held with the Bank of Estonia. In 1994 this released funds totaling 
about 160-170 million kroon to the banking system. (Bank of Estonia 1994c, Decree No. 1 
of the 4 July 1994, (1), (2), (3); Bank of Estonia 1995; Ross, M. and T., 1995) 
Restructuring of reserve requirements in July 1996 by the Bank of Estonia decreased the 
deductibility of cash holdings by 10 percent. From July 1997 until June 1998 banks were 
                                                                                                                                                                                
provided US-$ 12.5 million to the state energy system. Foreign banks and their branches are obliged to 
meet the same reserve requirements as residents. 
11  This is based on the Resolution 52 and its various extensions (Bank of Lithuania, Acts of Law 
Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania, various issues).    16
allowed to put only 30 percent into account. As cash demand declined, banks have been 
able to deduct only 20 percent since July 1998. In addition, the Bank of Estonia sought to 
increase liquidity buffers. (Bank of Estonia 1997c and 1998b and 1999a) 
In general, vault cash is barred from consideration in Lithuania, but during the banking 
crisis (from January until March 1996) banks were able to use their entire cash balances as 
reserve holdings. In December 1994 banks were allowed to cover a part of their reserve 
requirements with newly issued treasury bills (US-$ 12 million) as a means of increasing 
bids at treasury bill auctions. This measure served to support the government’s fiscal 
policy. At the same time, this implied a relaxation of reserve requirements. (Camard 1996) 
Consideration of foreign assets for meeting reserve requirements 
Since January 2001 banks have been allowed to include foreign assets in fulfilling their 
reserve requirements. Eligible assets have to be denominated in euro and they need to be 
high quality assets which have a credit rating (at least S&P AA-/Moody’s Aa3). Between 
January and June 2001 banks were permitted to meet 25 percent of their reserve 
requirements with foreign assets and since July 2001 banks could cover 50 percent of their 
reserve requirements with foreign assets. The Bank of Estonia has intended to make this 
instruments more market-based.  
  Banks used foreign assets to meet reserve requirements. Consequently, banks 
increased their external buffers, i.e. Estonian banks extended their opportunities to manage 
their liquidity in money markets of the euro area. According to the Bank of Estonia the 
monetary effect of the reform has been neutral since the reform was established because 
the expansion of high quality foreign assets equaled the contemporaneous reduction in the 
kroon reserve requirement. (Bank of Estonia 2002 and 2003a) 
Daily minimum reserve requirements 
Substantial fluctuations of reserve requirements can be reduced by establishing ceilings 
on daily variations of reserve requirements from the average or by establishing a floor 
referred to as the daily minimum reserve requirement. Since July 1996 the balance of any 




Table 2: Monthly and daily minimum reserve requirements in Estonia 
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In Estonia daily minimum reserve requirements have changed substantially. In 1996 daily 
minimum reserve requirements amounted to 20 percent of the reserve requirement (or 2 
percent of the reserve requirement base) and to 4 percent of the reserve requirement base in 
November 1997 and 5 percent in December 1997. The increase of both levels is due to the 
introduction of additional liquidity requirements, with commercial banks having to meet 
additional liquidity requirements since 1 November 1997. The purpose of the augmentation of 
daily minimum reserve requirements set by the Bank of Estonia was to stabilize bank liquidity 
fluctuations over a month, which were high at the time of introduction as a consequence of the 
Asian crisis. In addition, the higher reserve requirements offer more flexibility to the Bank of 
Estonia in times of crisis. (Bank of Estonia 1997a and 1998a) 
The increase of daily minimum requirements effected by means of additional liquidity 
requirements in November 1997 is clearly evident in Figure . The difference between monthly 
minimum requirements with and without additional liquidity requirements can also be 
observed. In addition, the figure depicts fluctuations of the balance of banks’ clearing 
accounts with the Bank of Estonia at the end of the day. (Bank of Estonia 1997b) The 
monthly average balance of banks’ accounts for the most part surpassed additional liquidity 
requirements and monthly minimum requirements until the autumn of 1998. The figure shows 
that banks had large amounts of excess reserves for a long period of time. However, liquidity 
buffers declined as a result of the Russian crisis. In the last quarter of 1998 the monthly 
average balance accounts of banks were below the additional liquidity requirements for a 
longer period. 
The increased additional liquidity requirements implemented in December 1998 were 
imposed for one month by the central bank as a penalty, because banks had failed to meet the 
previous month’s minimum requirements. However, already by the end of February 1999 
banks’ accounts with the central bank surpassed additional liquidity requirements by 100 
million EEK. (Bank of Estonia 1999a) The increase in reserve requirements in May 2000 was 
related to an international bond issue by Hansapank (2.35 billion EEK) and the rise in July 
1999 was generated by the first step of operational framework reform: the unification of 
additional reserve requirements with minimum reserves or liquidation of additional reserve 
requirements with a simultaneous rise in reserve requirements. For banks nothing really 
changed, except for the abolishment of harsh penalty measures for failure to meet additional 
liquidity requirement. (Bank of Estonia 2001) 
 
4.  Deposit facility: remuneration of reserve requirements 
Since July 2000 the Bank of Estonia has remunerated reserve requirements at the ECB 
deposit interest rate
12 to compensate for distortions of financial markets and to reduce the 
disadvantages of banks vis-à-vis other financial institutions which are not subject to reserve 
requirements. In addition, the Bank of Estonia’s intention was to relieve pressure on interest 
margins. This measure makes the operational framework more market-oriented. With a view 
to Estonia’s accession to the EMU, the measure was introduced as a means of approximating 
the ECB’s operational framework. (Bank of Estonia 1999b and 1999c, Eesti Pank Decree No. 




                                                           
12  The interest rate was the same for all types of deposits. (Lepik 2000, p. 5)  
Figure 7: Fulfilment of the reserve requirements in Estonia
13 
(In millions of Estonian kroon) 
Source: data provided by the Bank of Estonia 
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meeting the monthly average requirement  20
All Estonian compulsory reserves in excess of the minimum monthly level have carried 
interest since July 1996. The interest rate is calculated on the basis of an average balance for 
one month. The monthly average is based on a daily balance sheet, and it therefore also 
includes non-banking days. The interest rate is set by a special Decree of the Central Bank 
President, a procedure which makes it easier to change the rate. Commercial banks receive 
their interest on the first banking day of the following month. At first, the interest rate for the 
reserve requirements was calculated according to the German Bundesbank discount rate 
minus 1 percent on the last banking day of a month (15 percent on an annual basis). (Bank of 
Estonia 1997a) The interest rate equaled the Bundesbank discount rate between November 
1997 and December 1998. Since January 1999 this rate has been identical to the ECB deposit 
rate. The main aim was to absorb the relatively high excess reserves of commercial banks and 
thus to stabilize the demand of commercial banks for high-powered money. Furthermore, 
commercial banks now had an incentive to hold liquidity in EEK, and high reserve 
requirements were compensated for in this way. (Bank of Estonia 1997b and 1998a) 
“Eesti Pank pays credit institutions an interest on the account balance above minimum 
required level. ... The aim of the so-called standing facility is to foster the increase of 
domestic liquidity reserves. Interest payment on the amount exceeding the reserve 
requirement also allows to offset to some extent revenue earning advantages of financial 
intermediaries who are not subject to the reserve requirement and to diminish market 
distortions in the evolution of deposit and loan interest rates.” (Bank of Estonia 1998a, p. 56) 
In sum, reserve requirements have been the most important monetary tool in Estonia and 
Lithuania. Both central banks have changed several characteristics of this monetary 
instrument to affect the liquidity of the banking system. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
reserve requirements (RR) rules in Estonia and Lithuania. 
However, reserve requirements under currency boards have some disadvantages: they 
amount to a kind of tax
14 on commercial banks because the latter are required to hold non-
interest-bearing deposits with central banks. Reserve requirements entail some negative 
allocation effects in that commercial banks seek to circumvent them. Even though, since July 
1999, these deposits do bear interest (ECB deposit rate), the rates are low. Similarly, the Bank 
of Estonia has tried to compensate for these negative effects by allowing banks to use their 
foreign assets to meet reserve requirements. Moreover, adoption of reserve requirements as a 
monetary policy instrument may be inefficient because this instrument is not, like open 
market operations, a market-based one. Banks can use substantial portfolio shifts to react to 
changes in reserve requirements. 
Nevertheless, reserve requirements have many advantages for currency boards in transition 
countries. In the first place, the Estonian central bank does not need to create additional 
central bank money for this monetary tool. Second, reserve requirements take on a limited 
buffer function for interest rates, since these reserves have to be held on average only one 
month. Third, they can limit capital inflows by extending the reserve requirement base to 
include net liabilities vis-à-vis foreign banks as well as by introducing additional liquidity 
requirements.  
                                                           
14  This tax can also be regarded as compensation for central bank services, which cost less than market rates 
(Bisignano 1996, p. 14).  
Table 3:  Comparison of reserve requirements (RR) rules in Estonia and Lithuania 
 Estonia  Lithuania 
Changes of RR base  •  1992-7/1996: demand, savings and time deposits in domestic and foreign 
currency 
•  since 7/1996 debt securities issued by banks 
•  Since 7/1997: net liabilities of Estonian vis-à-vis foreign banks 
•  Since 8/98: credits to other commercial banks and financial guarantees issued 
to financing institutions and non-resident credit institutions 
•  liabilities to residents in domestic 
currency and in freely convertible 
currencies (time and demand 
deposits, including balances in 
customers’ clearing, current and other 
accounts) 
•  Since 1/1997: commercial banks’ 
liabilities in foreign currency  
•  Since 8/1997 commercial banks’ 
liabilities in non-convertible 
currencies 
•  Since 1/1998 non-residents holding 
both domestic and convertible 
currencies
  
•  Since 4/1998 commitments to foreign 
commercial banks 
Change of reserve ratio  Only in 1992: 15 to 10%  Yes, several times 
Cash component in RR   7/1994-6/1996: 50% of the monthly minimum RR 
7/1995-6/1996: 40% of the monthly minimum RR 
7/1996-6/1997: 30% of the monthly minimum RR 
since 7/1997: 20% of the monthly minimum RR 
In general not: exceptions during the 
banking crisis 
Use of RR as 
settlement credits  
Yes, against penalty interest rate  Yes, against penalty interest rate 
Daily minimum RR  1996: 20% of the monthly minimum RR 
1997-2000: 40% of the monthly minimum RR 
since 1/2001: 40% of kroon RR 
No 






Remuneration of RR  Since 1.7.99, ECB discount rate   No 
Additional liquidity 
requirements  
11/1997-6/2000: 3 % of the RR-base  No 
Assets eligible for meeting 
reserve reserve requirments 
•  “Deposits with the BoE” since 6/1998 
•  “Credits institutions cash in hand up to 20% of the monthly minimum RR” 
since 6/1998 
•  Banks can use quality foreign securities to meet up to 25% of RR between 1 
and 6/2001 and up to 50% of RR since 7/2001 
No 
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Fourth, this tool can help prevent confidence crises in transition countries. Frequent use of 
reserve requirements has not undermined the stability of the system in Estonia. Conversely, this 
flexibility has enhanced the stability of the liquidity system: it has been necessary to offset 
developments which boost or curb liquidity as a response to short-term changes in bank liquidity. 
This buffer is crucial because economic shocks frequently occur during the transition process. For 
these reasons this may be seen as an appropriate instrument for currency boards in transition 
countries. (Berensmann 2002) 
 
B.  Open market operations 
1.  Short-term certificates of deposit in Estonia 
Between May 1993 and May 2000 the Bank of Estonia issued certificates of deposit (CDs). As 
the overall volume ranged between 1 and 30 million EEK, the impact on the liquidity management 
of banks was small. Interest rates were between 4 and 8 percent. The Bank of Estonia issued 28-day 
discountable CDs with a nominal value of 100.000 EEK; these were sold at bi-weekly
15 auctions.
16 
Nearly all banks were eligible to participate. (Bank of Estonia 1993b and 2001, p. 44) 
The main functions of the Estonian CDs were to stabilize the money market, provide technical 
assistance, create an embryonic tool, and to offer a small subsidy to commercial banks. (Bank of 
Estonia 2000c; IMF, 1994b; Ross, T., 1994) In this way the Bank of Estonia provided banks an 
instrument for use in their dealings in the secondary market, since CDs also served as a collateral 
for interbank transactions. 
The Bank of Estonia was able to buy back or repurchase CDs at any time in the secondary 
market. When a bank bought a CD, it could resell it to the issuer or to a third party on the same day. 
The Bank of Estonia was obligated to redeem CDs before maturity at any time commercial banks 
wished. However, repurchase rates were above money market rate. Moreover, banks were able to 
use CDs as loan collateral which the borrower received back when he repaid the collateralized loan. 
The lender could hold the CD as long as the loan was not repaid, and he was even allowed to sell it. 
Since the Bank of Estonia promised to repurchase the CD, the lender had no reason to fear borrower 
illiquidity. CDs therefore increased trust among banks and supported the development of the money 
market. In addition, the Bank of Estonia could use the base money it received from the sale of 
certificates to provide liquidity assistance to commercial banks. (Bank of Estonia 1993a and 1993b; 
Ross T. 1994) 
2.  Repurchase agreements for government securities in Lithuania 
Between June 1997 and October 1998 the Bank of Lithuania adopted repurchase transactions for 
government securities in which the central bank bought government securities from banks. This 
instrument was implemented as a means of cushioning short-term money market interest rates. 
                                                           
15  Between 4 June 1994 and 20 June 1994 the sales were conducted every week (Bank of Estonia 1994a, p. 4). 
16  On the day before the auction, the Bank of Estonia was required to inform banks of the total amount and maturity 
of the certificates. The commercial banks offering the highest bids were given CDs, although the Bank of Estonia 
was able to set the lower and upper limits of the interest rates on CDs in accordance with the interbank market in 
Frankfurt and with a view to general conditions in the Estonian money market. The auction took one hour, and 
each participant (bank) was allowed to place two different bids. The sum of the bids was allowed not to be in 
excess of the banks’ corresponding accounts. In addition, the sum of the bids of all banks plus interest was not to 
exceed the amount offered by the Bank of Estonia (Bank of Estonia 1993b; IMF, 1994a). 23 
Repurchase transactions for government securities provided commercial banks with access to short-
term liquidity loans (up to one month) at periodic auctions. 
These were interest-rate auctions and therefore entailed an interest-rate tender. The Bank of 
Lithuania fixed the maximum volume of repurchase agreements, and commercial banks competed 
for loans by bidding for interest rates.
17 Until the end of 1998, the notice period for the repo 
auctions was 7 days, though the frequency was not fixed. (Bank of Lithuania 1997a; 1998a; 1998b, 
On the procedure for concluding and executing repurchase agreements of the Bank of Lithuania, 
Resolution No. 17, January 30, 1997 and No. 161, July 17, 1997 and 1999a) During the first fifteen 
months interest rates were relatively stable, ranging between 8 and 10 percent. However, interest 
rates increased in the autumn of 1998, a development which may have been a spillover effect from 
the Russian financial and currency crisis in mid-August 1998. 
As the transaction volume was low, amounting to 20 to 60 million LTL, this instrument did not 
significantly affect the liquidity of the banking system. However, the demand by the banks for 
repurchase transactions exceeded the volume offered by the central bank. Transactions took place 
irregularly and involved only small volumes. Since the end of 1998 no repo transactions have taken 
place because the intention of the central bank is to encourage banks to pursue transactions in 
financial markets. Furthermore, banks have received liquidity from the interbank market, the 
secondary government securities market or the forex market. (Bank of Lithuania 2000a and 2001) 
3.  Time deposit auctions in Lithuania 
The interest-rate floor for the money market issues was set by time deposit auctions conducted 
between August 1997 and February 2000; these were designed as an absorption facility for 
commercial banks. The aim of this instrument was to smooth out short-term interest rate 
fluctuations of the reserve requirement period when banks meet reserve requirement but have a 
surplus on their accounts. Time deposit auctions were conducted only until February 2000, because 
the authorities of the Bank of Lithuania were of the opinion that money markets work better without 
this monetary instrument. (Bank of Lithuania 2001) According to Resolution No. 75 of April 17, 
1997, the auction procedure for time deposits with the Bank of Lithuania may be both an interest 
rate and a volume tender. (Bank of Lithuania 1997b) However, usually the Bank of Lithuania 
adopted an American-style method. Interest rates fluctuated between about 3 and 10.5 percent. 
The volume of time deposit auctions varied substantially between 10 and 250 million LTL. The 
central bank’s decision concerning the volume of time deposit auctions was mainly dependent on 
two criteria: interest rates in the interbank market and the liquidity position of banks. In the first half 
of 1998 the restoration of the population’s savings generated a liquidity surplus in the banking 
system which induced the Bank of Lithuania to issue time deposits. The frequency of time deposit 
issues increased in the first half of 1999, but it declined again in the second half of the year. In the 
first six months the Bank of Lithuania conducted 10 auctions of time deposits with maturities of 6 
to 14 days, with an average interest rate of 4.88 percent and with a volume of about 100 million 
litas each. The consequence was reduced excess banking system liquidity. Between July and 
October 1999 the amount and frequency of time deposit auctions declined again, because part of 
restored savings and other investor funds were exchanged into foreign currency. Moreover, savings 
                                                           
17  The Bank of Lithuania planned to establish a fixed-rate tender, but no date was set for this. At such auctions the 
Bank of Lithuania would have fixed the interest rate and the banks would have announced how much of the issue 
they wanted at the fixed interest rate. 24 
restoration declined. Only four auctions of time deposits with a maturity of 7 days for 5.29 percent 
were conducted in this period. In November and December the central bank’s intention was set out 
to prevent negative effects of the Year 2000 problem on the money market and the forex market. 
The number of bidders varied between 1 and 9. 
 
C. Loans 
1. Emergency  credits 
Both central banks provided to a limited extent emergency credits to banks. Previously, the Bank 
of Estonia had been able to provide emergency liquidity loans to banks that were unable to meet 
their reserve requirements. A loan committee formed by the Bank of Estonia
18 made the decisions 
relating to these emergency credits. Subsequently, conditions for these credits were fixed, in a 
contract, by the Bank of Estonia in cooperation with the respective bank. However, the bank was 
not allowed to grant new credits to any customer until the credit was repaid. This restrictive 
measure did not apply to credits which had been agreed upon prior to liquidity problems. If the 
liquidity loan was not repaid on time, the Bank of Estonia imposed a lending moratorium on the 
bank until its solvency was reestablished. These emergency credits were abolished in 1994.
19 In 
addition, the Bank of Estonia provided some financial support to various banks (Box 2). 
                                                           
18  “The membership of the loan committee and their authority shall be determined in the form of regulations issued 
by the President of Bank of Estonia“. (Bank of Estonia 1993b) 
19  “Bank of Estonia shall grant banks with liquidity problems a possibility to apply for an emergency liquidity loan 
in order to re-establish their liquidity.“ (Bank of Estonia 1993b) There are no data available on the value of these 
emergency credit loans. 
Box 2:  Examples of financial support provided to banks by the Bank of Estonia 
•  Summer 1992: The Bank of Estonia provided 75 million EEK in emergency credits to the NEB, the Union Baltic 
Bank and the Tartu Commercial Bank. 
•  4 August 1994: ESB 
  The Bank of Estonia deposited 70 million EEK with the ESB as emergency liquidity assistance. 
•  26 September 1994: ESB 
    The Bank of Estonia provided the ESB a new credit (180 million EEK). 
•  3 October 1994: ESB 
    The Bank of Estonia provided a credit to the ESB.
a 
    Total support amounted to about 6 percent of reserve/base money. 
•  March 1995: The Bank of Estonia provided EEK 40 million in subsidies to the Northern Estonian Bank (NEB) 
 with. 
•  End of 1995: the government and the Bank of Estonia provided guarantees (of 220 million EEK) against specified 
   bad  loans. 
•  September 1998: The Bank of Estonia bought the majority of shares of the merged Forekspank and the Estonian 
    Investment Bank, thereby providing these banks with capital totaling 255 million EEK. 
a  No data was available on the amount. 
Sources:  De Castello Branco 1996; Hansson et al. 1996; IMF 1999a 25 
With reference to the Law of the Credibility of the Litas, the central bank was allowed to grant 
credits to commercial banks only in emergency cases during 1994 and 1997, when it acted as a 
lender of last resort for commercial banks. (BIS 1995, Lithuania. VI. Conduct of monetary policy) 
During 1995 and 1996 the Bank of Lithuania provided 210.8 million litas to commercial banks, a 
figure which amounted to 10 percent of the monetary base. (Bank of Lithuania 1997a) In the 
summer of 1995 the Bank of Lithuania provided liquidity to the Aura Bank, exhausting all of its 
excess reserves. (Hansson et al. 1996) The Vakaru Bank was likewise given financial support. In 
total, these two banks were given 70 million litas. 
2. Overnight  loans 
The upper limit of interest rates is set through the overnight loans or liquidity loans: banks 
receive overnight loans against collateral such as government securities
20 only in the case of banks 
having a negative balance of their account at the central bank. This instrument aims to secure 
ongoing interbank settlements. Overnight loans have rarely been used by banks and therefore play 
an important role to manage the liquidity of the banking system. In 2001 only one commercial bank 
was given an overnight loan (1.0 million LTL). 
Between December 1999 and March 2003 interest rates fluctuated between about 5 and 13 
percent. Since November 1999 the interest rate for overnight loans has been calculated as follows: 
the average of the highest value of overnight VILIBOR
21 over the last 15 calendar days (including 
the day on which the interest rate of the overnight loan is established) plus 2 percent (Figure ).
22 
(Bank of Lithuania 1999b and 2002) 
 
Figure 8: Interest rates of overnight loans and liquidity loans 
(In per cent) 
Source: Bank of Lithuania, 2003 
                                                           
20  Initially, banks need collateral in the form of government securities with a nominal value of 80 per cent; later on 
the value was et at 1.25 times the amount of the credit in question (Bank of Lithuania 2002). 
21  VILIBOR is the Vilnius interbank offered rate; it was introduced in November 1999. 


























































































3. Liquidity  loans 
The main purpose of liquidity loans is to support banks with liquidity problems and thus to 
enhance public confidence in commercial banks. Since the Lithuanian central bank reacts to banks’ 
needs, the frequency of such transactions has been irregular. However, as all other instruments 
except reserve requirements the significance of liquidity loans was low because the volume was 
small. 
Liquidity loans are subject to a strict procedure: each use of these standing facilities is carefully 
examined by the Bank of Lithuania. Initially, the Lithuanian central bank granted liquidity loans to 
commercial banks at an interest rate of 13 percent, with maturities of 1-3 months, against 
government or other guarantees
23. Since November 1999, the interest rates on loans and direct 
repurchase agreements have been calculated on the basis of the average value of the overnight 
VILIBOR over the last 30 days plus 4 percent. (Bank of Lithuania 1999a and 1999b) 
In 1997 the Bank of Lithuania provided liquidity loans amounting to about 70 million litas to 
commercial banks. Long-term purpose-oriented loans in national currency
24 declined by 37.9 
million litas in the last quarter of 1997 in relation to the third quarter. The main factor behind this 
was financial support provided to the Agricultural Bank. At the end of 1997 a “Law on Using Part 
of the 1992 Credit Emission of the Bank of Lithuania to Increase Share Capital of the Agricultural 
Bank” was adopted which allowed 55.4 million litas of the credit emission to be used to increase the 
Agricultural Bank’s share capital. A second tranche of the credit issue was used to buy the newly 
issued shares of the Agricultural Bank. (Bank of Lithuania 1998a) 
In 1998 commercial banks were given no liquidity loans. However, the Lithuanian central bank 
executed five short-term (7 days) direct repurchase agreements amounting to 154.25 million litas. 
As with liquidity loans, direct repurchase agreements are subject to a strict procedure. At the end of 
1998, long-term loans had declined by 22 million litas compared to the end of 1997. (Bank of 
Lithuania 1999a) In 1999 the Bank of Lithuania made only one liquidity loan (20 million litas) and 
executed one 2-month direct repurchase agreement for 80 million litas. By the end of 1999, the 
outstanding loans amounted to 20 million litas, which is very low (Bank of Lithuania 2000a). In 
2000 the Bank of Lithuania provided no liquidity loans. (Bank of Lithuania 2001) 
D. Standing  facility 
  Under a currency board regime forex markets take on the role of a standing facility. The Bank 
of Estonia or its staff have often stressed this specific role in their publications. (Bank of Estonia 
2000c; Lepik 2000) 
“The CBA by itself sets the limits for available monetary policy tools. Rapid development and 
further globalisation of financial markets induce further combination of CBA principles with 
modern liquidity management practices. For a CBA this means ensuring smooth functioning of 
standing facilities in broad sense, as discretionary means are normally not used for achieving 
monetary policy goals. Under standing facilities in broad terms we mean a standing facility for 
buying/selling forex deposit facility and required reserves system.” (Bank of Estonia 2000c, p. 6) 
                                                           
23  Other guarantees are not specified. 
24  “Long-term purpose-oriented loans in the national currency“ are not defined precisely. 27 
“The most important channel stabilising the monetary environment is standing facilitating forex 
market provided by the central bank. This can also be interpreted as an unlimited forex window 
where transactions of buying/selling foreign exchange against reserve currency are initiated by 
commercial banks.”(Lepik 2000, p. 1) 
Even though the forex market is not a monetary policy instrument, the central bank can influence 
the liquidity of the banking system by changing the spread of purchases and sales for forex 
transactions. Initially, the exchange rate spread of DEM/EEK purchases and sales for transactions 
between the Bank of Estonia and commercial banks amounted to 3 percent.
25 From May 1994 to 
July 1996 the spread was 0.002 EEK. At first glance, these small transaction costs may seem 
unimportant, but these costs prevented interest arbitrage from working efficiently. (Bank of Estonia 
1997a) In July 1996 the Bank of Estonia eliminated commissions for the buying and selling of 
foreign exchange; this resulted in a substantial increase in foreign exchange transactions between 
banks and the Bank of Estonia in the second half of the year. (Bank of Estonia 1997a) Similarly, 
introduction of real-time settlement systems has improved the efficiency of the forex market, and 
thus of the currency board as well, because this settlement system improves the convertibility of 
domestic currency into the anchor currency. (Lepik 2000) 
Not unlike the Estonian forex market, the Lithuanian forex has assumed the role of a standing 
facility since the introduction of the currency board arrangement. However, the spread for buying 
and selling forex was much higher than in Estonia: the bid-asked spread has amounted to 0.05 
percent for two-day transactions, to 0.075 percent for one-day transactions and 0.125 percent for 
same-day transactions. (Bank of Lithuania 2000b, Rules for Entering into and Handling the Litas 
and Anchor Currency Exchange Transactions between the Bank of Lithuania and Banks) Due to 
this spread for periods of up to one week, it is cheaper for banks to borrow in litas in the domestic 
interbank market than in international financial markets. The main reason behind the introduction of 
these commissions was to foster trade in domestic currency. 
III. Conclusion 
On the whole, the Bank of Estonia has used its monetary instruments in a prudent manner; it was 
flexible enough to provide liquidity to the banking system when banks were threatened by 
illiquidity. Other instruments than reserve requirements played a minor role in Estonia because the 
volume was small. Certificates of deposit, for example, were introduced to stabilize the money 
market, provide technical assistance, serve as an embryonic tool for the underdeveloped money 
markets, and to function as a small subsidy to commercial banks. Since the volume of CDs was 
very small, they had no more than only a limited influence on the liquidity of the banking system. In 
addition, the Estonian central bank provided emergency credits to domestic banks only in a limited 
number of cases which has not endangered price stability. 
Using monetary instruments, the Bank of Lithuania has been seeking to affect the liquidity of the 
banking system. In 1997 the Lithuanian central bank introduced the Monetary Policy Program for 
1997-2000, which was intended to abolish the currency board system. However, in 1999 the Bank of 
Lithuania established the Guidelines for Monetary Policy, which do not supersede the currency board. 
                                                           
25  According to the second clause of the Law of the Republic of Estonia on the Security of the Estonian Kroon 
(Clause 2: Rate of the Estonian kroon), “... the limit of technical fluctuations of the Estonian kroon is 3 per cent.“ 
(Bank of Estonia 1992, p. 38) 28 
Since 1997 the central bank has used monetary policy instruments to influence the short-term liquidity 
of the banking system; these include repo auctions, time deposit auctions, liquidity loans and reserve 
requirements, but these instruments have been small in volume. Therefore, the Bank of Lithuania has 
only affected substantially the liquidity of the banking system by using reserve requirements. 
Reserve requirements are the most important monetary tool in both countries, a fact which is 
clearly demonstrated by the high ratio of reserve requirements to the monetary base, especially in 
Estonia. Reserve requirements were introduced because central banks were able restrict capital 
inflows by enlarging the reserve requirement base to include net liabilities vis-à-vis foreign banks. 
Also, reserve requirements assume a limited buffer function, since these holdings are based only on 
the average over a month. Nevertheless, frequent use of reserve requirements has not endangered 
the stability of the system. In fact, this flexibility has improved the stability of the liquidity system: 
it has been necessary to cushion developments which boost or curb liquidity as a response to short-
term excess liquidity or shortages of banks. 
In 1996, the Bank of Estonia has abolished the spread for buying/selling forex, the forex market 
operates efficiently as a standing facility. The growing level of integration into international financial 
markets has also been reducing the significance of the domestic interbank market as a liquidity buffer. 
This is reflected in declining turnovers in the domestic interbank market since the end of 1998. On the 
contrary, the Lithuanian central bank has not abolished the spread for buying/selling forex. 
Consequently, the forex market does not function as efficiently as a standing facility as in Estonia. 
The interbank market offers a cheaper possibility for short-term borrowing (up to one week). 
Overall, the monetary policies of the Estonian and Lithuanian central bank have not endangered 
the stability of the monetary and exchange rate systems. On the contrary, monetary policy 
instruments have cushioned the effect of economic shocks on interest rates and on the volatility of 
banks’ liquidity. 29 
References 
 
Abazorius, Darius. “Monetary Policy in Lithuania.” Paper presented on the Analysis & Operations course, Bank of 
Lithuania, 12-23 February 1996. 
______ “Strategy of the Bank of Lithuania during the Integration into the EU.” Paper presented on the seminar: 
Currency Boards – Experience and Prospects, Bank of Estonia, 5-6 May 2000. 
Balino, Tomas Jose / Enoch, Charles and comprising Alain IZE, Veerathai Santipraho/Stella Peter, (1997), Currency 
Board Arrangements. Issues and Experiences, IMF Occasional Paper No. 151, Washington D.C. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). “Handbook on Central Banks of Central and Eastern Europe.” Basle, 1995. 
______ “Handbook on Central Banks of Central and Eastern Europe.” Basle, 1998. 
Bank of Estonia. “The Monetary Reform in Estonia 1992.” Tallinn, 1992. 
______. Eesti Pank Bulletin, No. 2, Tallinn, 1993a. 
______. “Various Regulations and Decrees in 1993.” Tallinn, 1993b. 
______. “Annual Report 1993.” Tallinn, 1994a. 
______. “Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Estonia.” Tallinn, 1994b. 
______.“Various Regulations and Decrees in 1994.” Tallinn, 1994c. 
______.“Annual Report 1994.” Tallinn, 1995. 
______.“Various Regulations and Decrees in 1996.” Tallinn, 1996. 
______.“Annual Report 1996.” Tallinn, 1997a. 
______. “Various Press Releases.” Tallinn, 1997b. 
______.“Various Regulations and Decrees in 1997.” Tallinn, 1997c. 
______. “Annual Report 1997.” Tallinn, 1998a. 
______. “Monetary Developments & Policy Survey.” Tallinn, 1998b. 
______. “Monetary Policy and Policy Survey. First Half of 1998, Tallinn, 1998c. 
______. “Annual Report 1998.” Tallinn, 1999a. 
______. “Monetary Policy and Policy Survey.” First Half of 1999, Tallinn, 1999b. 
______. “Various Regulations and Decrees in 1999.” Tallinn, 1999c. 
______. “Annual Report 1999.” Tallinn, 2000a. 
______. “Monetary Developments & Policy Survey: March 2000.” Tallinn, 2000b. 
______. “Monetary Policy Operational Framework Reform 2000.” Tallinn, 2000c. 
______. “Annual Report 2000.” Tallinn, 2001. 
______. “Annual Report 2001.” Tallinn, 2002. 
______. “Annual Report 2002.” Tallinn, 2003a. 
______. “Statistics on the internet side of the Bank of Estonia.” Tallinn, internet: http://www /ee/epbe, as of end-March 
2003b. 
Bank of Lithuania. “Law on the Credibility of the Litas.” Vilnius, 1995. 
______. “Acts of Law. Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania in 1996.” Vilnius, 1996. 
______. “Monetary Policy Programme of the Bank of Lithuania for 1997-2000.” Vilnius, 1997a. 
______. “Acts of Law. Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania in 1997.” Vilnius, 1997b. 
______. “Annual Report 1997.” Vilnius, 1998a. 
______. “Acts of Law. Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania in 1998.” Vilnius, 1998b. 
______. “Annual Report 1998.” Vilnius, 1999a. 
______. “Acts of Law. Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania in 1999.” Vilnius, 1999b. 
______. “Annual Report 1999.” Vilnius, 2000a. 30 
______. “Acts of Law. Regulating the Activities of the Banks of Lithuania in 2000.” Vilnius, 2000b. 
______. “Annual Report 1999.” Vilnius, 2001. 
______. “Annual Report 2001.” Vilnius, 2002. 
______. Statistics on the internet side of the Bank of Lithuania. internet: http://www.lbank.lt/ 
Eng/about/Kryptis.htm, as of end-March 2003. 
Berensmann, Kathrin. “Currency Boards: A Monetary and Exchange Rate Solution for Transition Countries? The 
Cases of Estonia and Lithuania.”, in: Duwendag, Dieter,  Schriften zur Monetären Ökonomie, Vol. 45, Nomos 
Verlag, Baden Baden, 2002, pp. 256. 
Bisignano, Joseph. “Varieties of Monetary Policy Operating Procedures: Balancing Monetary Objectives with Market 
Efficiency.” Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper, No. 35, Basle, 1996. 
Camard, Wayne. “Discretion with Rules? Lessons from the Currency Board Arrangement in Lithuania.” IMF Paper on 
Policy Analysis and Assessment, No. 1, Washington D.C., 1996. 
De Castello Branco, Marta/Alfred Kammer/L. Effie Psalida. “Financial Sector Reform and Banking Crises in the 
Baltic Countries.” IMF Working Paper, No. 134, Washington D.C., 1996. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): Transition Report 2003. Integration and Regional 
Cooperation, London, 2003. 
Fleming, Alex/Lily Chu ; Marie-Renee Baker. “The Baltics-Banking Crises Observed, World Bank Policy Research.” 
Working Paper, No. 1647, Washington D.C., 1996. 
Hanke, Steve H., Lars Jonung and Kurt Schuler. “Russian Currency and Finance. A Currency Board Approach to 
Reform”, Routledge, London and New York, 1993. 
Hansson, Ardo/Triinu Tombak.  “Banking Crises in the Baltic States: Causes, Solutions, and Lessons.” Paper 
Prepared for the Second Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 26-28 June, 1996. 
IMF. “Memorandum of Economic Politics of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for the Period of October 1, 
1994 to September 30, 1997.” Washington D.C., 1994a. 
______. “Estonia, Economic Review.” No. 7, Washington D.C., 1994b. 
______. “Republic of Estonia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.” IMF Staff Country IMF Report, No. 99/74, 
Washington, D.C., 1999a. 
______. “Republic of Lithuania: Staff Report for 1999, Article IV Consultation.” Washington, D.C., 1999b. 
______. “International Financial Statistics, various issues.” 2001. 
Lepik, Ilmar. “Evolution of Monetary Operational Framework & Challenges Ahead.” Bank of Estonia, Tallinn, 2000. 
Ross, Tanel. “Some Aspects of the Monetary Policy of the Bank of Estonia, Central Bank Policy Department.” Paper 
presented at the International Conference: Financial Policy and Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Budapest, September, 2-3, 1994. 
Ross, Tanel and Märten. “The Lessons of Currency Board Approach in Stabilising Transitional Economies: The Case 
of Estonia.” Preliminary draft presented at the seminar: Monetary Reform: Key Priorities and Challenges, in 




















    33
 
 
Figure A1:  Estonian central bank balance sheet as of January 2003 
  (In million of EEK) 
ASSETS 
Foreign assets  15881.7
Gold  44.2
Convertible foreign currency assets  14526.0
Special Drawing Rights (SDR's)  1.0
Participation in IMF  1298.4
Other claims to IMF  12.2
Non-convertible foreign currency  0.0
Domestic assets  264.0
Loans  71.1
government  0
financial institutions  9.1
other  62.0
Bonds  0
Shares and participations  0.1
Other assets  11.1
Fixed assets  181.8
Total assets  16145.8
LIABILITIES   
Foreign liabilities  1446.8
Foreign debts  144.3
IMF kroon accounts  1298.3
Accounts of non-residents  4.2
Domestic liabilities  11287.1
Notes and coins in circulation  7783.6
Accounts of banks and other current liabilities  3466.6
accounts of banks  3411.5
other  55.1
Securities (certificates of deposit issued)  0
Convertible foreign currency deposits  5.5
Non-convertible foreign currency deposits  0
Other liabilities  31.4
Provisions  0
Capital and reserves, profit/loss  3411.9
Total liabilities  16145.8
Source:  Bank of Estonia, 2003   34
 
 
Figure A2:  Lithuanian Central Bank balance sheet as of January 2003 
  (In million of LTL) 
ASSETS 
Foreign assets  8 202,3
Claims on: 
central government  6,8
private sector  7,8
commercial banks  15,8
nonbank financial institutions  0,0
Other assets  213,6
Total assets  8 446,4
 
LIABILITIES 
Foreign liabilities  493,9
repurchase agreements  490,7
IMF loans to the LB  0,0
other liabilities to nonresidents  3,2
o/w: in convertible currency  0,0
Domestic liabilities 
currency outside the LB  4 221,4
deposits of commercial banks  808,9
o/w: in convertible currency  346,8
central government deposits  2 128,0
o/w: in convertible currency  1 913,3
deposits of other residents  22,2
o/w: in convertible currency  0,1
Counterpart funds  28,5
Capital accounts  704,4
Other liabilities  39,1
Total liabilities  8 446,4
Source:  Bank of Lithuania, 2003  
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